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Abstract
This paper attempts to unearth quality of corporate governance practices of Indian Banking
sector and highlight whether the corporate governance practices of listed public and private
sector banks are symmetric post subprime crisis. The study examines that whether the key
corporate governance factors like capital adequacy ratio, board size, number of independent
directors and CEO duality affects the performance of banks. In addition to this, the paper goes on
to find the essence of shareholding by non-executive directors and the regularity of directors in
attending the board meetings. Further, for the perusal of corporate governance practices followed
in the Indian banking sector a corporate governance index has been compiled from the data of all
listed Indian banks. Moreover, the paper endeavors to exhume any relationship between the
educational qualification of directors and its contribution on the banks performance, if an . The
results provides an insight of the corporate governance structure of Indian banking sector and
exhibit that the public and private sector banks have asymmetric corporate governance practices
post subprime crisis. The empirical results of multiple regression analysis demonstrate a positive
impact of corporate governance factors on Indian bank s performance.
Keywords: corporate governance, banks board, board si e, board monitoring
Introduction
Corporate governance is a way of life that moulds and directs the roles, responsibilities and
rights of management and board of directors of organisations with a view to achieving the
corporate objectives of the organisation and capturing the interests of various stakeholders.
Corporate governance practices are relatively a new issue in Indian society and came into
prominence in the 90 s due to securities scam in 1992 and disappearance of number of
companies after rising capital in stock market in mid-90. In light of the Asian financial crisis,
high profile scandals in Russia and Latin America, and the increased focus placed on governance
practices in the Middle East and North Africa, corporate governance has been brought to the
forefront and has become a strategic issue for businesses in the increasingly globalized economy.
Good corporate governance is required because of the existence of agency problems caused by
the separation of ownership of resources and managing those resources Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and minimize the conflict of interest between agents and principals. Sharma (2010a;
2010b) opines that corporate governance is the way organizations are managed and controlled
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and aims to achieve corporate excellence. Promoting the good corporate governance in banking
sector is crucial to its economic performance. Therefore the extent to which this performance is
achieved vis-a-vis corporate governance in the banking sector demands an in-depth exploration
investigation and perhaps it is also the focus of this study. The debate of corporate governance
goes decades back but the advancements in the recent past have changed the paradigm of this
debate. The studies of Qu, Jiang, and Zhang (2012) investigated empirically the performance of
banks in the BRIC countries (comprising Brazil, Russia, India, and China) during the financial
crisis. The period under study was from 2003 to 2010, and it was found that, from 2007 to 2008,
there was a significant decline in the banking efficiency due to the crisis. Similarly, GarciaMeca, Garcia-Sanchez, and Martnez-Ferrero (2015) have attempted to analyze the effect of
board diversity (gender and nationality) on performance in banks and found its positive impact
on banks performance. Dalwai, Rohaida, and Siti (2015) evaluates existing studies on the
relationship of corporate governance with firm performance in different regions and address the
need for similar analysis for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sector as well.
Theories of Corporate Governance
There is no single universe theory of corporate governance. Development of corporate
governance is a global occurrence, and a complex area including legal, cultural, ownership, and
structural differences. Thus, some theories might be more appropriate and relevant to some
countries than others or, more relevant at different times depending on what stage an individual
country, or group of countries, is at. The theories which define the corporate governance in
different ways are agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory, resource dependency
theory, social contract theory and legitimacy theory. The essence of the agency problem is the
separation of management and finance, or as defined in more standard terminology, the
separation of ownership and control (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Stewardship theory suggests the
unification of these two roles in one person who, as the steward of the organization, would act in
the organi ation s best interest. It has been empiricall established that the returns, for an
organization, improved by having both the positions (the CEO and the Chairman) combined
rather than separated (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). According to the stakeholder theory the
corporation must be run in the interest of stakeholders. According to the resource dependency
rule, the directors bring resources such as information, skills, key constituents (suppliers, buyers,
public policy decision makers, social groups) and legitimacy that will reduce uncertainty. Social
contract theory as well as legitimacy theory are based upon the notion that there is a social
contract between the society and an organisation.
Formulation of Hypothesis
Adams and Mehran (2003) stated that the practices of corporate governance in the banking sector
differ from other sectors because of their characteristics as a regulated industry. Gillan, Hartzell,
and Starks (2003) in their work hypothesized that corporate governance structures differ
systematically across industries and firms due to differences in the costs and benefits of the
monitoring mechanisms. Li and Harrison (2008) found that national culture has a dominant
influence on corporate governance structure. Nippani, Vinjamury, and Bathala (2008)
established that there exist significant differences between the governance structures of banks
based on their si e and that banks stock market returns are significantl influenced by board
composition. Cheung, Stouraitis, and Tan (2010) found that the quality of corporate governance
is very significant in explaining future company stock returns and risk. Kanojia (2010)
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endeavored to emphasize that if the board of directors contribute to the company at regular
interval, it improves the performance of banks. Utama and Musa (2011) shows that corporate
governance practice, bank size and capital adequacy ratio have positive influence on bank
performance in Indonesia. Wang, Lu, and Lin (2012) proved that corporate governance is
important for the operating performance of BHCs. Panchasara and Bharadia (2013) showed that
the corporate governance (CG) disclosure practices are positively associated with financial
performance of Indian Banks by using the financial and non-financial parameters explained in
the Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure issue b the ISAR
(International Standards of Accounting and Reporting). Sarpal (2014) found the significance of
firm size by revealing that the relationships between some of the selected voluntary board
practices do vary according to the firm size status. Madhani (2015) has found that board
committees are major contributor to overall corporate governance and disclosure practices of
Indian rms which help to understand that apart from statutor requirement of audit committee
there is also a need for remuneration as well as nomination committees to improve the overall
standard of corporate governance. After reviewing the literature we found that the banks with
poor corporate governance practice performed worse and led to the crisis (Chambers, 2009; Ross
& Crossan, 2012). According to Indian Banking Regulation Act 1949 not less than 51% of the
total number of the board of directors comprising members with demonstrable professional and
other experience in specific sectors like accountancy, agriculture and rural economy, banking,
co-operation, economics, finance, law, small-scale industry, any other matter the special
knowledge of, and practical experience in, which would, in the opinion of the Reserve Bank of
India, be useful to the banking company. De Jonghe, Disli, and Schoors (2012) found that CEO
non-duality, education level of executives, and a business education of the CEO and/or the
chairman all relate to much better risk/return efficiency in the post-crisis period for banks. Their
findings suggest that strict regulation in combination with improved board structure and
composition might go a long way to improve the risk/return profile of banks. Largely it has been
found that there exists a strong relation between governance structure, agency problem and
firm s performance level. Most of studies indicate better governed companies are more profitable
and have higher firm value especially in countries with weak legal environments. Prior studies of
Mace (1971); Pfeffer (1972); Lipton and Lorch (1992); and Jensen (1993) highlighted
contrasting results of board size and effective monitoring. It has been empirically tested that
large boards are generally less effective as compared to smaller boards due to communication
and coordination advantages. (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorch, 1992). In view of important
findings discussed above the present paper aims to gauge the performance of all listed Indian
banks post subprime crisis and its dependency, if any on corporate governance practices. Further,
it attempts to examine that whether the key corporate governance factors highlighted in the
banking literature like capital adequacy, board size, number of independent directors and duality
affects the performance of banks. In addition to it the paper attempts to find essence of
shareholding by non-executive directors and regularity of directors in attending board meetings.
The objective of this paper is to find that whether corporate governance affects the banks
performance during the post crisis period and providing in-depth knowledge about the corporate
governance practices along with the impact of education qualification of NEDs on the
performance of Indian banking sector. The study proposes the following alternate hypothesis:
H 1: The capital adequacy ratio has a significant effect on the bank performance.
H 2: Board size has significant impact on bank performance.
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H 3: Attendance rate of directors at board meeting has a significant influence on bank
performance.
H 4: Bank performance is significantly affected by number of independent directors on
board.
H 5: Number of shares held by NEDs has a significant effect on the bank performance.
H 6: Bank performance is significantly affected by CEO duality.
H 7: Education Qualification of NEDs has a significant influence on bank performance.
Data and Methodology
This paper is based on the perusal of secondary data obtained from all the listed public as well as
private sector banks in India. The relevant information about the key factors of corporate
governance has been obtained through content analysis of the annual reports published by the
banks. India has forty listed banks during the sample period of four years post subprime crisis
2008-09 to 2011-12. The data collected from content analysis of one hundred and sixty annual
reports has been categorized to facilitate descriptive analysis and to apply multiple regression
analysis thereon. The key corporate governance factors which exhibit significant correlation have
further been regressed with the independent variables of board size, number of independent
directors, shareholding by non-executive directors, duality, capital to risk asset, educational
qualification of the board and ROA, ROE, ROI as proxy to bank performance. ROA (Return on
Assets) equals after tax net income (profits) divided by average total assets of bank (Lin &
Zhang, 2009; Saunders & Cornett, 2005) and reflects the deployment of bank assets to yield its
income (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Andres & Vallelado, 2008). The central bank has set ROA as
proxy for profitability while giving reference to the Indian banking conditions. Further, total
assets as a denominator is very sensitive to the accounting methods used by the banks. The study
also uses ROE (Return on Equity) as a proxy of bank performance relevant to shareholder s
investment (Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper, & Udell, 2005; Kim & Rasiah, 2010). ROI (Return on
Investment) is one of the determinants of key performance indicators of private sector banks. In
order to evaluate the cause and effect of independent variables on the performance proxies the
following regression equations have been formulated.
ROE =

+ 1 BOARD_SIZE + 2 ATTENDANCE + 3 SHARES + 4 ID + 5 CRAR + 6 CEO_DUALITY +

(1)

ROA =
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Where:
and : constant and coefficient of applied model respectivel .
: all the factors which affect the dependent variable but not included in the model.
BOARD_SIZE: total number of directors in the bank
ATTENDANCE: average attendance rate of the directors in the board meetings
SHARES: percentage of shares held by NEDs
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ID: percentage of Independent directors in the board
CRAR: Capital to Risk Assets Ratio
CEO_DUALITY: dummy variable, its value is 1 when there is no duality and 0 in case of
duality.
GR: when number of NEDs who are graduate, is equal to or greater than average, then we
put 1 and 0 otherwise.
PG: when number of NEDs who are post graduate, is equal to or greater than average,
then we put 1 and 0 otherwise.
DOCT: when number of NEDs who have the degree of M.phil or PHD, is equal to or
greater than average, then we put 1 and 0 otherwise.
PROF: when number of NEDs who have the professional degrees, is equal to or greater
than average, then we put 1 and 0 otherwise.
Analysis and Findings
The results in Table 1 of descriptive analysis shows that the average ROA is 1percent with
minimum and maximum value being -0.4 percent and 1.63 percent consecutively. The average
ROE is 15.47 percent with a minimum and maximum value consecutively -4.59 and 22.69
percent and the mean value of ROI is 6.91 with minimum of 6.09 and maximum of 7.57 percent.
The minimum values are exhibiting the status just after the subprime crisis and there after the
values tend to be positive as well as increasing showing that the sector maintains the assets and
returns to the shareholder. We may state that except the year succeeding the subprime crisis, the
banking sector in India has been surviving with an above average growth and operates in risk
averting conditions. The average Tier I capital is 9.87 percent with a minimum of 6.86 and
maximum of 16.67 percent and the average of CRAR is 13.83 percent with minimum and
maximum value consecutively are 11.70 and 18.92 percent. This is perhaps due to the
requirements of Central bank that the sector maintains a minimum CRAR of 9 percent and Tier I
capital of 6 percent. Further, it indicates that Indian banks were well capitalised during the post
crisis period and are conservative in their capital structure policy. The average growth rate of
Indian bank is 24.45 percent with a minimum of -7.36 and maximum of 80.83 percent. The range
of growth exhibited by the statistics highlight that some banks in the sample are extremely
profitable but a few of them still have a questionable bottom line.
Average NPA is 0.89 percent which is not high, with minimum and maximum value
consecutively is 0.07 and 1.92 percent which implies the banking system in India in respect of
securitization of their assets is doing well. Although, there have been times especially during the
1980-90 wherein NPA was a pan India problem. The data reveals such scenario has been a past
and problem of NPA has been insignificant during the sample period. The stringent regulations
of central banks may be credited for this advancement. The average board size in our sample is
10.68 with the maximum of 14.25 which indicates that the Indian banks follow the guidelines of
RBI that all the banks should have minimum of 10 board members. The clause 49 of the listing
agreement in India requires that every board shall meet at least four times a year with a gap of
not more than four months between two meetings and the sample of the study shows that average
attendance rate at board meetings is 8.18 with the maximum of 12.01 and minimum value of
4.88 which means that banks follow this requirement way above the statutory norms. Average
percentage of independent directors in board is 68.85 percent with a minimum of 36.36 and
maximum of 91.22 percent.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
N
ROE (%)
40
ROA (%)
40
ROI (%)
40
Tier I (%)
40
CRAR (%)
40
Growth (%)
40
NPA (%)
40
board size
40
attendance
40
Shares (%)
40
ID (%)
40
Source: Research Compilation

Minimum
-4.59
-0.4
6.09
6.86
11.7
-7.36
0.07
7
4.88
0
36.36

Maximum
22.69
1.63
7.57
16.67
18.92
80.83
1.92
14.25
12.01
2.4125
91.22

Mean
15.466
1.002
6.9101
9.8732
13.8334
24.454
0.8905
10.675
8.182
0.13712828
68.8536

Std. Deviation
5.63985
0.41783
0.3965
2.23233
1.72068
17.02644
0.4908
1.45478
1.50587
0.445400439
13.59183

Table 2: Pearsons Correlation Anal sis
ROE

ROE
1

ROA

ROI

board size attendance

.771** 1
0
.368* 0.272 1
ROI
0.019 0.089
0.264 0.134 0.093 1
board size
0.099 0.41
0.57
0.125 0.081 0.012 .721**
1
attendance
0.442 0.62
0.941 0
0.15
-0.015 0.042 -0.125
-0.217
ID
0.355 0.928 0.797 0.444
0.18
-0.046 0.075 0.204 -0.054
-0.006
shares
0.777 0.644 0.207 0.739
0.972
-0.004 .502** -0.117 -0.05
-0.056
CRAR
0.978 0.001 0.472 0.757
0.733
-0.063 0.112 -0.096 -.391*
-0.288
growth
0.701 0.492 0.557 0.013
0.072
-.500** -.650** -0.03 0.187
-0.045
NPA
0.001 0
0.853 0.248
0.781
-0.111 .427** -0.186 -0.177
-0.063
tier I
0.494 0.006 0.252 0.275
0.699
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

ID

shares CRAR growth NPA tier I

ROA

1
-0.195
0.229
-0.097
0.552
-0.214
0.186
0.033
0.84
-0.014
0.931

1
-0.033
0.842
0.194
0.231
0.111
0.495
0.231
0.151

1
0.204
0.207
-.334*
0.035
.783**
0

1
-0.295
0.064
0.223
0.167

1
-.323* 1
0.042

Correlation Analysis
The degree of association among the variables of the study is explored in Table 2 with Pearson
correlation. The results indicate that ROA has a positive correlation with Tier I capital and
CRAR (both significant at 99% confidence level) implying that for banks, capital adequacy plays
a key role in the determination of profitability. Capitalization and profitability are considered as
indicators of banks risk management efficienc and provides cushion against losses not covered
by current earnings (Olalekan & Adeyinka, 2013). Further, the correlation analysis reveals that
board size has negative correlation with growth rate which is significant at 95% confidence level
which points out that larger board are generally less effective than smaller boards because of
communication and co-ordination problems (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). It s
worthy to note that NPA have a negative correlation with Tier I capital and CRAR (both
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significant at 95% confidence level), probably when bank do not lend it leads to higher CRAR
which results to lower NPA and vice-versa. The bivariate analysis is intriguing because the
results provide a basis for interpreting the results of regression.
Multiple Regression Analysis
In order to examine the hypothesis 1, 2, and 3 that whether there is any impact of corporate
governance factors on banks performance. The results of regression have been summarized in
table 3 for each year of study. In year 2008-09 ID and CRAR have a significant positive effect
on bank performance measured by ROE. CRAR and share have a significant positive effect and
CEO duality has a negative effect on bank performance measured by ROA. The R2 is 17.52%,
26.05% and 18.14% indicates the variation caused by CG variables on ROE, ROA and ROI
respectivel , though it s t picall less as in the case of cross sectional panel data. In year 200910 we found significant positive influence of CRAR and share on ROA and ROI respectively.
Similarly CEO duality has a negative impact on bank performance measured by ROI and ROE.
Furthermore in year 2010-11 we found significant positive relation between CRAR and ROA
and between board size and ROE. ROI is negatively influenced by attendance and positively
influenced by shares. It has been observed that CRAR has a significant positive impact on bank
performance measured as ROE and ROA in the year 2011-12. The implications of the findings
based on multiple regression analysis indicates that ID has a positive effect on bank performance
(ROE), so we may state that the null hypothesis H4 may be rejected which states that bank
performance does not affected by number of independent directors on board. Thus this study
corroborates the argumentation that more number of independent directors in board increase the
performance of bank (Cornett, McNutt, & Tehraian, 2009). But it does not show any significant
relationship with ROA and ROI. The CRAR has a positive effect on profitability as measured by
ROA and ROE, so the null hypothesis H1 may be rejected that the capital adequacy ratio has no
influence on bank performance. The results are consistent with previous research conducted by
Unite and Sullivan (2003); Naceur and Kandil (2009); Beltratti and Stulz (2009); Utama and
Musa (2011). Thus, the e istence of the bank s capital is an important instrument to preserve the
liquidity of the bank (Siamat 2004). This finding supports the central bank s effort to strengthen
bank s capital base b increasing the minimum capital adequac ratio from 8% to 9% (In
accordance with Basel III norms, Indian banks will have to maintain their capital adequacy ratio
at nine percent as against the minimum recommended requirement of eight per cent). However
we fail to find the positive effect of CRAR on ROI. Further it is found that shareholding of
NEDs has a positive effect on bank performance measured by ROA and ROI as the large
shareholders come with different sets of skills and preferences when the invest in the companies.
And with the power these shareholders wield, their skills and preferences can have significant
effects on bank profitability. Therefore null hypothesis H5 may be rejected that number of shares
held by NEDs has no impact on bank performance. These results are also supported by Bhagat
and Bolton (2008) and Ehikioya (2009). Meanwhile, CEO duality has a negative influence on
bank performance measure by ROE, ROA and ROI, suggesting the need to separate the position
of CEO and chairperson to insure the independence of board for optimum bank performance.
Therefore, this result is consistent with the view that when one person holds the seat of CEO and
chairman, there would be a more serious agenc problem and reduction in the boards
effectiveness of monitoring top management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Thus we conclude that null
hypothesis H7 may be rejected that bank performance does not affected by CEO duality. Board
size has a positive effect on ROE, so we may reject the null hypothesis H2 which states that
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board size has no impact on bank performance. The result is consistent with the proposition that
firms with larger boards are more efficient in their asset utilization and they are more likely to
discipline their CEO for poor performance than smaller boards. This result is also supported by
Adams and Mehran (2003) who find that the banking sector has a larger board size compared to
the manufacturing sector and finally led to increased bank performance. Attendance has negative
effect on ROI.
It may be because of higher attendance in board meetings leads to high expense in the payment
of sitting fee which is given out of the profits of the corporate. Therefore, we may reject the null
hypothesis H3 which states that attendance rate of directors at board meeting has no influence on
bank performance which is also supported by Spong and Sullivan (2012) who said that average
attendance rate is not statistically related to bank risk. Board size and attendance are statistically
significant only in the year 2010-11. However the OLS method has not indicated high level of R2
which means that bank profitability is also affected by other factors too. it is always high and
increasing when bank profitability is measure by ROA except year 2009-10 and it becomes
44.01% in 2011-12. Thus on the basis of the results below we conclude that CG practice has the
positive influence on the bank performance, so we may state that our objective that corporate
governance affects banks performance hold truth. Therefore this result corroborates the previous
studies (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Brown & Caylor, 2006). The finding
of the study are in congruence with the results of Utama and Musa (2011) and Wang et al. (2012)
who showed that CG practice have the positive influence on bank performance in pre-crisis
period. Similarly, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) proved that banks with stronger CG mechanism
were associated with higher profitability during the crisis period. Hence our results are consistent
with the previous studies results of pre-crisis period as well as during the crisis. During the
study period 2008-09 to 2011-12 there were 1322 NED whose education qualification needs to
be collected. Due to scarcity of data we got hold of the profile of 968 NEDs i.e., 73.22%. There
were 33.16% graduate, 32.02% were post graduate, 14.46% had the doctoral degree and 20.35%
of them were professionals during the study period. Hence, the basis of these results and their
profiles which were given in the annual reports we may state that Indian banking has well
educated and experienced non-executive directors.
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Table 3: Relationship Between Bank Performance And Corporate Governance
2008-09
ROE
Variable
Coefficient
C
5.90
BOARD_SIZE
-0.66
ATTENDANCE
0.76
SHARES
1.52
ID
0.17
CRAR
0.01
CEO_DUALITY
-3.43
R-squared
0.175
Adjusted R-squared 0.025
2010-11
ROE
Variable
Coefficient
C
0.80
BOARD_SIZE
1.10
ATTENDANCE
-0.51
SHARES
2.51
ID
0.07
CRAR
0.32
CEO_DUALITY
-3.04
R-squared
0.176
Adjusted R-squared 0.026

Prob.
0.669
0.462
0.397
0.614
0.041
0.987
0.252

Prob.
0.944
0.055
0.365
0.164
0.309
0.510
0.109

ROA
Coefficient
-1.02
-0.04
0.06
0.34
0.01
0.11
-0.34
0.261
0.126

Prob.
0.257
0.511
0.339
0.086
0.196
0.012
0.079

ROA
Coefficient
-1.26
0.06
-0.01
0.19
0.00
0.12
0.02
0.377
0.264

Prob.
0.107
0.125
0.730
0.126
0.792
0.001
0.848

ROI
Coefficient
4.73
0.12
-0.04
0.17
0.01
0.06
-0.30
0.181
0.033

Prob.
0.000
0.110
0.563
0.497
0.240
0.302
0.220

ROI
Coefficient
7.19
0.03
-0.08
0.29
0.01
-0.03
-0.23
0.206
0.062

Prob.
0.000
0.490
0.096
0.056
0.357
0.420
0.139

2009-10
ROE
Coefficient
2.22
1.10
-0.99
-1.02
0.14
0.25
-5.53
0.223
0.082
2011-12
ROE
Coefficient
-13.96
0.70
0.37
0.51
-0.02
1.52
-2.66
0.224
0.083

Prob.
0.855
0.238
0.260
0.695
0.110
0.690
0.050

Prob.
0.292
0.369
0.663
0.863
0.800
0.033
0.317

ROA
Coefficient
-0.96
0.10
-0.09
-0.01
0.00
0.10
-0.24
0.219
0.077

Prob.
0.299
0.169
0.187
0.951
0.469
0.035
0.250

ROA
Coefficient
-1.30
-0.01
0.04
-0.03
0.00
0.17
-0.01
0.440
0.338

Prob.
0.122
0.836
0.433
0.868
0.470
0.000
0.963

ROI
Coefficient
7.46
-0.03
-0.05
0.54
0.00
-0.01
-0.60
0.287
0.158
ROI
Coefficient
7.60
-0.03
0.06
0.25
0.00
-0.02
0.04
0.096
-0.068

Prob.
0.000
0.681
0.494
0.019
0.652
0.902
0.013

Prob.
0.000
0.658
0.414
0.304
0.700
0.767
0.854
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Table 4: Relationship between Education qualification and Bank performance
Variable
C
GR
PG
DOCT
PROF
R2
Adjusted R2

ROE
Coefficient
Prob.
17.69802
0
0.755548
0.7133
-3.355024
0.1168
-0.663105
0.7394
-2.381705
0.2214
0.090266
-0.013704

ROA
Coefficient
Prob.
1.178575
0
0.164205
0.2667
-0.322562
0.0371
-0.123134
0.3887
-0.189098
0.1746
0.156748
0.060377

ROI
Coefficient
Prob.
6.889504
0
-0.046601
0.7476
0.018956
0.8981
0.227273
0.1118
-0.083131
0.5413
0.086517
-0.017881

Hereafter in the succeeding section we checked the hypothesis 4, 5 and 6 that whether there is
any impact of education qualification of NEDs on bank performance. The relationship predicted
in equations 4, 5 and 6 is shown in the regression results produced in the above table 4 which
exhibit the relationship between education qualification of NEDs and bank performance
measured by ROE, ROA and ROI. It is found that in equation 4 GR is positively and PG, DOCT
and PROF are negatively related with profitability (ROE) but not statistically significant. In
equation 5 GR and profitability (ROA) is directly (positively) related as the slope coefficient of
the model is positive (0.164). While the P value is 0.2667 which do not reject the null
hypothesis, meaning that it is not statistically significant. PG, DOCT and PROF are inversely
related to the profitability as there signs are negative (-0.322, -0.123 and -0.189 respectively).
The null hypothesis is not rejected by DOCT and PROF as they are not statistically significant
except PG which is statistically significant at 5% as the p value is 0.0371. In equation 1.6 where
ROI is the dependent variable, GR and PROF are negatively related to profitability, but not
statistically significant. The PG and DOCT are directly related to profitability but are not
statistically significant. The results indicate that we fail to reject the null hypothesis H07 which
states that education qualification of NEDs has no influence on bank performance as none of
them has positive significant impact on profitability. In brief it may be said from the above
results that profitability is not affected by education qualification and other factors like finance
experience, management experience (Hau & Thum, 2009), government background, business
background, age and gender influence the profitability. Also according to Banking regulation Act
1949 the composition of Board of Directors comprising members with demonstrable professional
and other experience in specific sectors like agriculture, rural economy, cooperation, SSI, law,
etc.
Construction of Corporate Governance Index (CGI)
In order to find out the quality of corporate governance mechanism of Indian banks during the
post crisis we have constructed the corporate governance index (CGI). The data from annual
reports has been used to identify the mechanisms and practices of corporate governance. We
have used the dummy variables which are not legally enforced by clause 49 of the Listing
Agreements with the Stock Exchanges. The dummy variables which are included in CGI are as
the CEO duality and chairman of the non- mandatory committees is NED, then variables are
binary. Similarly if the complete disclosure of the information regarding education qualification
of NEDs, percentage of independent directors in the board and percentage of shareholding by
NEDs, ownership pattern, ED s and NED s compensation are there in annual reports then the
variables take value 1, otherwise 0. The CGI s values can range from 0 to 12. An important note
for the study is the fact that if in the index a bank presents a low level of corporate governance
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quality in a particular year, it does not mean that the bank actually has bad level of CG and if a
bank ranked highly in the index, it does not mean that the bank has a good quality of CG
mechanism. What we have tried to find in the study is the level of CG quality perceived by an
outsider without an insider means, tools or accessibilit to information during the stud s time
period 2008-09 to 2011-12. The sample includes 40 listed banks, so the total no. of observations
is 160. The frequencies for the CGI have been calculated and then divided these frequencies into
three groups; the first group of observations is located at values 0 to 4, the second at values 5 to 8
and third group at values 9 to 12. The group leads to 11.9% of the sample is ranked among the
first group, while 60% is ranked among the second group and only 28.1% among the third group.
If we join the second and third group then it covered 88.1% of the sample.
Independent-Samples T-Test
For testing the hypothesis that there is no difference between the CG practice of public and
private sector banks of India Independent t-test has been used. The independent t-test compares
the means between two unrelated groups on the same continuous, dependent variable. For the
equal-variance t test the assumptions are: the observations should be independent, random
samples from normal distributions with the same population variance. For this t-test we have
taken the mean value of all the dummy variables which are shown in table 7. So these variables
collectively make the CG structure of a bank, which we want to test. Type of bank is the
independent variable in this test which means for public banks we write 1 and for private bank
we write 0 and the corporate governance mechanism is the dependent variable.
H08: 1- 2=0 ( 1= 2) There is no difference in the mean value of corporate governance
mechanism between public banks and private sector banks.
H09: 1- 2 0 ( 1
2) There is a difference in the mean value of corporate governance
mechanism between public banks and private sector banks.
Testing the hypothesis as a two-tailed test with = 0.05 the t value of -8.436 falls within the
critical region defined by the critical value of 2.048 and the p-value is less than alpha of 0.05.
Therefore we may state that there is no difference in the mean value of corporate governance
mechanism between public banks and private banks. As private banks have more mean value of
corporate governance (mean = 9.1094, sd = 1.77475) than public (mean = 5.1562, sd = 1.19513).
So we may state a significant statistical difference in these averages. Therefore we may say that
there is no difference between CG practice of listed public and private sector banks of India.
Conclusion
We observed that the results of regression are not consistent during the study period but
collectivel the results point out that Indian banks performance is positivel affected b board
size, number of independent directors, CRAR, and number of shares held by NEDs and it is
negatively influenced by attendance and CEO duality. Hence we may conclude that the main
factors of corporate governance of banks in India are board size, percentage of independent
directors in the board, CRAR, number of shares held by NEDs and non CEO duality. We may
say that the study supports the Agency theory of corporate governance as bank performance is
negatively related with CEO duality. Hence we may also state that CG factors have positive
impact on Indian banks performance during post crisis period, which is supported by the pre-
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crisis period results as well as during the crisis period. The implication of these findings is that
corporate governance practices enhances the banks performance and the findings supports the
central banks efforts to enhance the CG practice in the Indian banking sectors. The stud reveals
that the performance and corporate governance variables of the listed Indian banks have been in
a relatively comfortable position as read in other developed nations during the post subprime
crisis period may be due to prudent regulation of the Reserve Bank of India and not so prevalent
derivative holdings of banks. The study has tested the underlying assumptions of OLS model and
on the basis of overall results we found that the error term is normally distributed and
homoscedastic. Further there is no auto correlation in the error term. Panel data is inappropriate
in this model as the error term do not reflect hetroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Therefore the
research can be used for further decision making. The study gives a scope of further research by
extending the model and including more variables like age and gender of board member and role,
responsibility, eligibility criteria for appointment of independent NEDs.
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